In a study where you’re asking students to put on a bunch of gear that they known monitors where they look and ask them to behave as normal, understanding how thinking about your thinking seemed important. Bromme, Pieschl, and Stahl in “Epistemological beliefs are standards for adaptive learning” give an account of how epistemological beliefs, meta-cognition knowledge, and meta-cognitive skill affect learning seemed like a natural choice. They go beyond the scope needed for my simple proposal, but in a more serious study, accounting for the circular nature of thought processes, especially if you are making a mechanism or schematic map of how culture, attention, sensory modalities, and learning interact, this meta-cognitive account would be indispensable.
On another level, we can consider this meta-cognitive account an important means of internalizing cultural norms of thinking and even of basic neurological mechanisms such as where you should look and what you should look at. Bromme, Pieschl, and Stahl then provide important evidence for not only how a study of thought should be set up, but also provide background on the basic direction such studies should take. In light of Marambe et al. and their study of cross-cultural learning patterns, the notions of meta-cognition and self-directed learning are particularly important.
Bromme, R., Pieschl, S., & Stahl, E. (2010). Epistemological beliefs are standards for adaptive learning: a functional theory about epistemological beliefs and metacognition. Metacognition & Learning, 5(1), 7-26.